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1 Introduction 
 
As crime and other underground economic activities (including shadow economic ones) are a 
fact of life around the world, most societies attempt to control these activities through various 
measures like punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education. Gathering statistics 
about who is engaged in underground (or crime) activities, the frequencies with which these 
activities are occurring and the magnitude of them, is crucial for making effective and 
efficient decisions regarding the allocations of a country’s resources in this area. 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get accurate information about these underground (or as a 
subset shadow economy) activities on the goods and labor market, because all individuals 
engaged in these activities wish not to be identified. Hence, the estimation of the shadow 
economy activities can be considered as a scientific passion for knowing the unknown.  
 
Although quite a large literature1) on single aspects of the hidden economy exists a 
comprehensive survey has just been written by Schneider (the author of this paper) and Enste 
concentrating on the size of the shadow economy in terms of value added. Moreover, the 
subject is still quite controversial2) and there are disagreements about the definition of shadow 
economy activities, the estimation procedures and the use of their estimates in economic 
analysis and policy aspects.3) Nevertheless around the world, there are strong indications for 
an increase of the shadow economy and little is known about the size of the shadow 
economies in transition, development and developed countries for the year 2000. The size, the 
causes and the consequences are different for different types of countries, but there are some 
comparisons that can be made and that might be interesting for social scientists, the public in 
general, and helpful for politicians, who need to deal with this phenomenon sooner or later. 
These attempts of measurement are obviously very difficult, since the shadow economy 
activities are performed exactly to avoid official registration. Moreover, if you ask an 
academician, a public sector specialist, a policy or economy analyst, or a politician, what the 
shadow economy is all about, or even how big it is, you will get a wide range of answers.  
 
                                                          
1) The literature about the „shadow“, „underground“, „informal“, „second“, “cash-“ or „parallel“, economy is 
increasing. Various topics, on how to measure it, its causes, its effect on the official economy are analyzed. See 
for example, survey type publications by Frey and Pommerehne (1984); Thomas (1992); Loayza (1996); Pozo 
(1996); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998a); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997), and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); and for an overall survey of the global evidence of 
its size in terms of value added Schneider and Enste (2000). 
2) Compare e.g. in the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature “controversy: on the hidden 
economy”. 
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The scientific fascination of the underground economy has inspired me to tackle this difficult 
question and undertake the challenging task of collecting all available data on the shadow 
economy for 110 countries, and finally provide some insights about the main causes of the 
shadow economy and its effect on the official economy. In section 2 an attempt is made to 
define the shadow economy. Section 3 presents the empirical results of the size of the shadow 
economy over 110 countries all over the world. Section 4 examines the main causes of the 
shadow economy. In section 5 the various methods to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy are shortly presented, and in section 6 a summary is given and some conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
 
2 The Definition of a Shadow Economy: An Attempt 
Most authors trying to measure the shadow economy face the difficulty of how to define it. 
One commonly used working definition is: all currently unregistered economic activities 
which contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product.4) Smith 
(1994, p. 18) defines it as „market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or 
illegal that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.“ As these definitions still leave 
open a lot of questions, table 1 may be helpful for developing a better feeling for what could 
be a reasonable consensus definition of the legal and illegal underground or shadow economy. 
 
From table 1 it becomes clear that the shadow economy includes unreported income from the 
production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions - hence all 
economic activities which would generally be taxable were they reported to the state (tax) 
authorities. In general, a precise definition seems quite difficult, if not impossible as „the 
shadow economy develops all the time according to the 'principle of running water': it adjusts 
to changes in taxes, to sanctions from the tax authorities and to general moral attitudes, etc.“ 
(Mogensen, et. al. 1995 p. 5). This paper does not focus on tax evasion or tax compliance, 
because it would get to long, and moreover tax evasion is a different subject, where already a 
lot of research has been underway.5) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3) Compare the different opinions of Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1999) and Giles (1999). 
4) This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), 
and Lubell (1991). 
5) Compare, e.g. the recent survey of Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998). 
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Table 1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities1) 
Type of Activity Monetary Transactions Non Monetary Transactions 
 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling and fraud  
 
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Produce or growing 
drugs for own use. Theft for own 
use. 
 
 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax 
Avoidance 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
Legal 
Activities 
Unreported income 
from self-
employment; Wages, 
salaries and assets 
from unreported work 
related to legal 
services and goods 
Employee 
discounts, 
fringe benefits 
Barter of legal 
services and 
goods 
All do-it-yourself 
work and 
neighbor help 
1) Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
 
3 The Size of the Shadow Economies all over the World – Findings 
for 110 Countries 
 
For single countries and sometimes for a group of countries (like the OECD or transition 
countries) research has been undertaken to estimate the size of the shadow economy using 
various methods and different time periods. In tables 2 to 8, an attempt is made to undertake a 
consistent comparison of estimates of the size of the shadow economies of various countries, 
for a fixed period, generated by using similar methods which will be discussed in chapter 6, 
by reporting the results for the shadow economy for 110 countries all over the world for the 
periods 1999/2000.6) 
 
                                                          
6)One should be aware that such country comparisons give only a very rough picture of the ranking of the size of 
the shadow economy over the countries, because each method has shortcomings, which are discussed in chapter 
6. See, e.g., Thomas (1992, 1999) and Tanzi (1999). A least in this comparison the same time period 
(1999/2000) is used for all countries. If possible, the values were calculated as averages over the period 
1999/2000, respectively. 
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3.1 Developing Countries 
 
The physical input (electricity) method, the currency demand and the model (DYMIMIC) 
approach are used for the developing countries. The results are grouped from Africa, Asia, 
South America. They are shown in tables 2, 3, 4 and figures 1, 2, 3.  
 
The results for 24 South African countries are shown in table 2 and figure 1.  
 
Table 2 – Figure 1 
 
On average the size of the shadow economy in Africa (in percent of GDP) was 41% for the 
years 1999/2000. Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria have with 59.4, 58.3 and 57.9% by far the 
largest shadow economy. In the middle field are Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar 
with 40.3, 39.9 and 39.6%. At the lower end are Botswana with 33.4, Cameroon with 32.8 
and South Africa with 28.4%. In sum one realizes that the size of the shadow economy which 
is more like a parallel economy in Africa is quite large.  
 
In table 3 and figure 2the results for Asia are shown and here it is somewhat difficult to treat 
all Asian countries equally because Japan, Singapore and Hongkong are highly developed 
states and the others more or less developing countries. But as I decided to group according to 
continents so I leave these countries series as it stands now, realizing that not all are 
developing countries.  
 
Table 3 – Figure 2 
 
If we consider the 26 Asian countries, where the results are shown in table 3, Thailand has by 
far the largest shadow economy in the year 1999/2000 with the size of 52.6% of official GDP. 
Followed by Sri Lanka with 44.6% and Philippines with 43.4%. In the middle are India with 
23.1%, Israel with 21.9% and Taiwan and China with 19.6%. At the lower end are Singapore 
with 13.1% and Japan with 11.3%. On average the Asian developing countries have a size of 
the shadow economy of 26% of official GDP for the years 1999/2000. One realizes that the 
average size of the shadow economy is considerably lower compared with African and South 
and Latin American States. 
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Table 2: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 23 African nations 
 AFRICA GNP at 
market prices 
(current US$, 
billion) 2000 
Shadow 
Economy in 
% of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
GNP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas method 
(current US$)
Private 
consumption 
per capita 2000 
(current US$) 
Population 
aged 15-64, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
Population, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
1 Algeria 506,1 34,1 172,6 538,8 1580 731 18555 30399 
2 Benin 21,5 45,2 9,7 167,2 370 283 3192 6272 
3 Botswana 52,8 33,4 17,6 1102,2 3300 1835 882 1602 
4 Burkina Faso 21,7 38,4 8,3 80,6 210 148 5418 11274 
5 Cameroon 82,8 32,8 27,2 190,2 580 415 7921 14876 
6 Cote d'Ivoire 86,1 39,9 34,4 239,4 600 418 8773 16013 
7 Egypt, Arab Rep. 996,6 35,1 349,8 523,0 1490 1126 38708 63976 
8 Ethiopia 63,3 40,3 25,5 40,3 100 77 33356 64298 
9 Ghana 48,3 38,4 18,5 126,7 330 210 10778 19306 
10 Kenya 102,2 34,3 35,1 120,1 350 272 16160 30092 
11 Madagascar 38,0 39,6 15,1 99,0 250 216 8112 15523 
12 Malawi 16,6 40,3 6,7 68,5 170 135 5232 10311 
13 Mali 22,6 41,0 9,3 98,4 240 168 5407 10840 
14 Morocco 324,6 36,4 118,1 429,5 1180 728 17567 28705 
15 Mozambique 1) 35,8 40,3 14,4 84,6 210 170 9346 17691 
16 Niger 18,1 41,9 7,6 75,4 180 142 5213 10832 
17 Nigeria 367,3 57,9 212,6 150,5 260 147 65863 126910 
18 Senegal 42,9 43,2 18,5 211,7 490 361 5067 9530 
19 South Africa 1226,4 28,4 348,3 857,7 3020 1871 26713 42801 
20 Tanzania 89,8 58,3 52,4 157,4 270 226 17714 33696 
21 Tunisia 185,7 38,4 71,3 806,4 2100 1231 6163 9564 
22 Uganda 61,6 43,1 26,5 129,3 300 243 10722 22210 
23 Zambia 27,9 48,9 13,6 146,7 300 274 5097 10089 
24 Zimbabwe 1) 71,4 59,4 42,4 273,2 460 357 6515 12627 
 AVERAGE 188 41 69 280 764 491 14103 25624 
1) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures.  
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank Data, Washington D.C., 2002.  
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Figure 1: Africa: Shadow Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000
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Table 3: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 26 Asian countries 
 ASIA GNP at market 
prices (current 
US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy in 
% of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in bill.) 2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
GNP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas method 
(current US$)
Private 
consumption 
per capita 2000 
(current US$) 
Population aged 
15-64, total 
(thousand) 2000
Population, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
1 Bangladesh 468,9 35,6 166,9 131,7 370 279 76241 131050 
2 China 1) 10652,8 13,1 1395,5 110,0 840 413 862212 1262460 
3 Hongkong, China 1654,7 16,6 274,7 4302,7 25920 13902 4966 6797 
4 India 4531,8 23,1 1046,8 104,0 450 294 625220 1015923 
5 Indonesia 2) 1426,6 19,4 276,8 110,6 570 490 135563 210421 
6 Iran 937,7 18,9 177,2 304,3 1610 760 37715 63664 
7 Israel 1060,1 21,9 232,2 3659,5 16710 10458 3857 6233 
8 Japan 49011,6 11,3 5538,3 4025,1 35620 19966 86423 126870 
9 Jordan 83,1 19,4 16,1 331,7 1710 1377 2794 4887 
10 Korea, Rep. 4550,2 27,5 1251,3 2450,3 8910 5540 34081 47275 
11 Lebanon 2) 174,2 34,1 59,4 1367,4 4010 3346 2718 4328 
12 Malaysia 823,9 31,1 256,2 1051,2 3380 1642 14375 23270 
13 Mongolia 1) 9,5 18,4 1,8 71,8 390 268 1463 2398 
14 Nepal 56,9 38,4 21,8 92,2 240 178 12729 23043 
15 Pakistan 596,0 36,8 219,3 161,9 440 343 75308 138080 
16 Philippines 793,2 43,4 344,2 451,4 1040 648 44545 75580 
17 Saudi Arabia 1736,6 18,4 319,5 1330,3 7230 2747 11214 20723 
18 Singapore 983,7 13,1 128,9 3240,9 24740 9176 2849 4018 
19 Sri Lanka 160,0 44,6 71,4 379,1 850 610 13055 19359 
20 Syria 159,6 19,3 30,8 181,4 940 718 9070 16189 
21 Taiwan, China 3144,0 19,6 616,2 2720,5 13880 8695 15521 22173 
22 Thailand 1205,4 52,6 634,1 1052,0 2000 1179 41367 60728 
23 Turkey 2009,2 32,1 644,9 995,1 3100 2183 41917 65293 
24 Unit. Arab Emir. 0,0 26,4 0,0 7191,4 27240 N.A. 2070 2905 
25 Vietnam 1) 313,5 15,6 48,9 60,8 390 266 48125 78523 
26 Yemen 73,9 27,4 20,2 101,4 370 282 8337 17507 
 AVERAGE 3331 26 531 1384 7037 3298 85144 132681 
1) Still a mostly communist dominated country. 2) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures.  
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002.  
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Figure 2: Asia - Shadow Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000
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In table 4 and figure 3 the size of the shadow economy for the year 1999/2000 for 17 South 
and Latin American states is shown. The average size of shadow economy of these 17 states is 
41%. 
 
 
Table 4 – Figure 3 
 
 
The largest shadow economy has Bolivia with 67.1%, followed by Panama with 64.1% and 
Peru with 59.9%. The lowest shadow economy has Chile with 19.8% and before is Argentina 
with 25.4%. If one compares the results of tables 2-4 one see that the size of the shadow 
economy of South America and Africa is somewhat similar and the size of the shadow 
economy in Asia is somewhat lower. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Transition Countries 
 
The sizes of the shadow economies of the transition countries which have been again estimated 
using the currency demand, the physical input and DYMIMIC approach are presented in table 5 
and figure 4. 
 
 
Table 5 – Figure 4 
 
 
23 transition countries have been investigated and the average size of the shadow economy in 
percent of official GDP is 38% for the year 1999/2000. The by far largest shadow economy has 
Georgia with 67.3%, followed by Azerbaijan with 60.6% and Ukraine with 52.2%. In the middle 
field are Bulgaria and Romania with 36.9 and 34.4% and at the lower end are Hungary with 25.1, 
the Czech Republic with 19.1 and the Slowak. Republic with 18.9%.  
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Table 4: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 17 Latin and South American Countries 
 SOUTH AMERICA  GNP at 
market 
prices 
(current 
US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
in % of 
GNP 
1999/2000
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
GNP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas method 
(current US$)
Private 
consumption per 
capita 2000 
(current US$)  
Population 
aged 15-64, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
Populatio
n, total 
(thousand
) 2000 
1 Argentina  2774,4 25,4 704,7 1894,8 7460 5457 23175 37032 
2 Bolivia  80,6 67,1 54,1 664,3 990 732 4695 8329 
3 Brazil  5697,7 39,8 2267,7 1424,8 3580 2186 112569 170406 
4 Chile  681,4 19,8 134,9 908,8 4590 2937 9793 15211 
5 Colombia  788,5 39,1 308,3 789,8 2020 1294 26427 42299 
6 Costa Rica  146,2 26,2 38,3 998,2 3810 2802 2383 3811 
7 Dominican Republic  186,3 32,1 59,8 683,7 2130 1824 5208 8373 
8 Ecuador  123,8 34,4 42,6 416,2 1210 668 7774 12646 
9 Guatemala  187,4 51,5 96,5 865,2 1680 1409 6016 11385 
10 Honduras  57,9 49,6 28,7 426,6 860 612 3519 6417 
11 Jamaica  69,9 36,4 25,5 950,0 2610 1910 1615 2633 
12 Mexico  5597,7 30,1 1684,9 1526,1 5070 3961 60868 97966 
13 Nicaragua  21,1 45,2 9,5 180,8 400 415 2755 5071 
14 Panama  93,7 64,1 60,1 2089,7 3260 2107 1804 2856 
15 Peru  519,2 59,9 311,0 1245,9 2080 1471 15856 25661 
16 Uruguay  193,8 51,1 99,0 3066,0 6000 4403 2079 3337 
17 Venezuela, RB  1193,2 33,6 400,9 1448,2 4310 3144 14868 24170 
 AVERAGE  1083 41 372 1152 3062 2196 17730 28205 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
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Figure 3: South America: Shadow Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000
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Table 5: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 23 European Transformation Countries 
 EUROPE - 
TRANSFORMATION 
COUNTRIES 
 GNP at 
market 
prices 
(current 
US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
in % of 
GNP 
1999/2000
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Econom
y GNP 
per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas 
method 
(current 
US$) 
Private 
consumption 
per capita 2000 
(current US$) 
Population aged 
15-64, total 
(thousand) 2000
Population, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
1 Albania 2)  38,6 33,4 12,9 374,1 1120 1012 2188 3411 
2 Armenia  19,3 46,3 8,9 240,8 520 479 2572 3803 
3 Azerbaijan 1) 2)   49,2 60,6 29,8 363,6 600 389 5170 8049 
4 Belarus 1)  299,6 48,1 144,1 1380,5 2870 1707 6803 10005 
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2)  46,2 34,1 15,8 419,4 1230 N.A. 2830 3977 
6 Bulgaria  116,7 36,9 43,1 560,9 1520 1060 5563 8167 
7 Croatia  187,2 33,4 62,5 1543,1 4620 2483 2970 4380 
8 Czech Republic  500,1 19,1 95,5 1002,8 5250 2690 7165 10273 
9 Georgia  30,5 67,3 20,5 424,0 630 514 3347 5024 
10 Hungary  440,6 25,1 110,6 1182,2 4710 2903 6856 10022 
11 Kazakhstan 1)  170,5 43,2 73,7 544,3 1260 785 9838 14869 
12 Kyrgyz Republic  12,2 39,8 4,9 107,5 270 207 2950 4915 
13 Latvia  71,8 39,9 28,6 1165,1 2920 1885 1609 2372 
14 Lithuania  111,2 30,3 33,7 887,8 2930 1970 2482 3695 
15 Moldova 1) 2)   13,6 45,1 6,1 180,4 400 323 2893 3550 
16 Poland  1568,2 27,6 432,8 1156,4 4190 2614 26555 38650 
17 Romania  363,8 34,4 125,2 574,5 1670 1209 15355 22435 
18 Russian Federation 1)  2484,4 46,1 1145,3 779,1 1690 825 101243 145555 
19 Slovak Republic  187,7 18,9 35,5 699,3 3700 1890 3732 5402 
20 Slovenia  180,7 27,1 49,0 2723,6 10050 5008 1396 1988 
21 Ukraine  308,5 52,2 161,0 365,4 700 374 33833 49501 
22 Uzbekistan 1)  74,2 34,1 25,3 122,8 360 197 14620 24752 
23 Yugoslavia 2)  84,5 29,1 24,6 273,5 940 629 7115 10637 
 AVERAGE  320 38 117 742 2354 1354 11699 17193 
1) Still a mostly communist dominated country. 2) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures. 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
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Figure 4: Europe - Transformation Countries: Shadow Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000
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3.3 OECD-Countries 
 
3.3.1 West-European OECD-Countries 
 
For 16 West-European-OECD-Countries the size of the shadow economy in percent of official 
GDP for the year 1999/2000 has been calculated. The results are presented in table 6 and in figure 
5. 
 
Table 6 – Figure 5 
 
Greece and Italy have by far the largest shadow economy with 28.6 and 27.0%. In the middle field 
are Denmark with 18.2 and Germany with 16.3% and at the lower end are Austria with 10.2 and 
Switzerland with 8.8%. The average size of these 16 OECD-Countries of the shadow economy is 
18% for the year 1999/2000. 
 
3.3.2 North-American and Pacific OECD-Countries  
 
In table 7 and figure 6 the size of the shadow economy in % of official GDP for the year 
1999/2000 for four OECD-Countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand  and United States,) is 
shown.  
 
Table 7 – Figure 6 
 
Among these countries Canada has the largest shadow economy with 16.3%, followed by 
Australia with 15.3%, the New Zealand with 12.7% and finally the United States with 8.8%. On 
average the size of the shadow economy of these four countries is 13.5%. 
 
3.3.3 Shadow economy and shadow economy labor force of 21 OECD countries 
 
Finally some additional results of the shadow economy over an extended time period, i.e. from 
1989 to 2002; and shadow economy labor force of 21 OECD countries are shown. The size and 
development of the shadow economy of 21 OECD countries over the time period 1989/90-
2001/02 is presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8 
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Table 6: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 16 OECD – West European Countries 
 EUROPE - 
OECD-WEST 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
GNP at market 
prices (current 
US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy in 
% of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
GNP per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas method 
(current US$)
Private 
consumption 
per capita 2000 
(current US$) 
Population 
aged 15-64, 
total 
(thousand) 
2000 
Populatio
n, total 
(thousand
) 2000 
1 Austria 1859,8 10,2 189,7 2572,4 25220 14659 5501 8110 
2 Belgium 2290,6 23,2 531,4 5693,3 24540 11899 6736 10252 
3 Denmark 1601,1 18,2 291,4 5875,0 32280 14546 3562 5336 
4 Finland 1194,0 18,3 218,5 4598,8 25130 11542 3469 5177 
5 France 13046,5 15,3 1996,1 3736,3 24420 12033 38453 58892 
6 Germany 18592,5 16,3 3030,6 4094,6 25120 13241 55915 82150 
7 Greece 1151,1 28,6 329,2 3420,6 11960 8404 7116 10560 
8 Ireland 802,1 15,8 126,7 3580,3 22660 12073 2546 3794 
9 Italy 10667,2 27,0 2880,1 5443,2 20160 11253 39026 57690 
10 Netherlands 3675,4 13,0 477,8 3246,1 24970 12395 10835 15919 
11 Norway 1602,3 19,1 306,0 6595,2 34530 15382 2913 4491 
12 Portugal 1032,4 22,6 233,3 2513,1 11120 6643 6776 10008 
13 Spain 5524,0 22,6 1248,4 3408,1 15080 8403 26965 39465 
14 Sweden 2244,8 19,1 428,7 5183,7 27140 12931 5710 8869 
15 Switzerland 2537,7 8,8 223,3 3356,3 38140 22057 4836 7180 
16 United Kingdom 14170,7 12,6 1785,5 3078,2 24430 15492 38996 59739 
 AVERAGE 5125 18 894 4150 24181 12685 16210 24227 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
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Figure 5: Europe - OECD-West European Countries: Shadow Economy in % of GNP 
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Table 7: The size of the shadow (and official) economy of 4 OECD Countries 
  GNP at 
market prices 
(current US$, 
billion) 2000 
Shadow 
Economy in 
% of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Econom
y GNP 
per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas 
method 
(current 
US$) 
Private 
consumption per 
capita 2000 
(current US$)  
Population aged 
15-64, total 
(thousand) 2000
Populatio
n, total 
(thousand
) 2000 
1 Canada 6713,5 16,4 1101,0 3465,3 21130 11933 20995 30750 
2 United States 98253,0 8,8 8646,3 3000,8 34100 22265 185783 281550 
 AVERAGE 52483 13 4874 3233 27615 17099 103389 156150 
  
  GNP at 
market prices 
(current US$, 
billion) 2000 
Shadow 
Economy in 
% of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow 
Economy 
(current USD 
in billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Econom
y GNP 
per 
capita 
GNP per 
capita 2000, 
Atlas 
method 
(current 
US$) 
Private 
consumption per 
capita 2000 
(current US$)  
Population aged 
15-64, total 
(thousand) 2000
Populatio
n, total 
(thousand
) 2000 
1 Australia 3791,5 15,3 580,1 3096,7 20240 12556 12895 19182 
2 New Zealand 460,7 12,7 58,5 1649,7 12990 9204 2504 3831 
 AVERAGE 2126 14 319 2373 16615 10880 7700 11506 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
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Figure 6: Shadow Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000 - Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and United States
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Table 8: The Size of the Shadow Economy in OECD Countries 
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of GDP) using the Currency Demand Method 
OECD-Countries Average 
1989/90 
Average 
1991/92 
Average 
1994/95 
Average 
1997/98 
Average 
1999/2000 
Average 
2001/20021) 
1. Australia 10.1 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.3 14.1 
2. Belgium 19.3 20.8 21.5 22.5 22.2 22.0 
3. Canada 12.8 13.5 14.8 16.2 16.0 15.8 
4. Denmark 10.8 15.0 17.8 18.3 18.0 17.9 
5. Germany 11.8 12.5 13.5 14.9 16.0 16.3 
6. Finland 13.4 16.1 18.2 18.9 18.1 18.0 
7. France 9.0 13.8 14.5 14.9 15.2 15.0 
8. Greece 22.6 24.9 28.6 29.0 28.7 28.5 
9. Great Britain 9.6 11.2 12.5 13.0 12.7 12.5 
10. Ireland 11.0 14.2 15.4 16.2 15.9 15.7 
11. Italy 22.8 24.0 26.0 27.3 27.1 27.0 
12. Japan 8.8 9.5 10.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 
13. Netherlands 11.9 12.7 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.0 
14. New Zealand2) 9.2 9.0 11.3 11.9 12.8 12.6 
15. Norweay 14.8 16.7 18.2 19.6 19.1 19.0 
16. Austria 6.9 7.1 8.6 9.0 9.8 10.6 
17. Portugal 15.9 17.2 22.1 23.1 22.7 22.5 
18. Sweden 15.8 17.0 19.5 19.9 19.2 19.1 
19. Switzerland 6.7 6.9 7.8 8.1 8.6 9.4 
20. Spain 3) 16.1 17.3 22.4 23.1 22.7 22.5 
21. USA 6.7 8.2 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.7 
Unweighted Average 
over 21 OECD 
countries 
13.2 14.3 15.7 16.7 16.8 16.7 
 
Sources: Currency demand approach, own calculations 
1) Preliminary values. 
2) The figures are calculated using the MIMIC-method and Currency demand approach. Source: Giles 
(1999b). 
3) The figures have been calculated for 1989/90, 1990/93 and 1994/95 from Mauleon (1998) and for 
1997/98 and 1999 own calculations. 
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For the 21 OECD countries either the currency demand method or the DYMIMIC method are 
used. The results for these countries are shown in table 8 over the period 1989/90 to 
2001/2002. Considering again the latest period 2001/2002, Greece has with 28.5% of official 
GDP the largest shadow economy, followed by Italy with 27.0% and Portugal with 22.5%. In 
the middle-field are Germany with a shadow economy of 16.3% of official GDP, followed by 
Ireland with 15.7% and France with 15.0% of official GDP. At the lower end are Austria with 
10.6% of GDP and the United States with 8.7% of official GDP. In OECD countries one 
realizes over time quite an increase of the shadow economies during the 90s. On average the 
shadow economy was 13.2% in these 21 OECD states in the year 1989/90 and it rose to 
16.7% in the year 2001/2002. If we consider the second half of the 90s, we realize that for 
some countries the shadow economy is not further increasing, even slightly decreasing, like 
for Belgium from 22.5% (1997/98) to 22.0% (2001/2002), for Denmark from 18.3% 
(1997/98) to 17.9% (2001/2002) or for Finland from 18.9% (1997/98) to 18.0% (2001/2002). 
For others, like New Zealand, it is still increasing from 11.9% (1997/98) to 12.6% 
(2001/2002), or Germany from 14.9% (1997/98) to 16.3 (2001/2002). Hence, one can’t draw 
a general conclusion whether the shadow economy is further increasing or decreasing at the 
end of the 90s. It differs from country to country but in some countries some efforts have 
been made to stabilize the size of the shadow economy and in other countries (like Germany) 
these efforts were not successfully.  
 
 
Having examined the size and rise of the shadow economy in terms of value added over time, 
the analysis now focuses on the „shadow“ labor market, as within the official labor market 
there is a particularly tight relationship and “social network” between people who are active 
in the shadow economy.7) Moreover, by definition every activity in the shadow economy 
involves a “shadow” labor market to some extent: Hence, the “shadow labor market” includes 
all cases, where the employees or the employers, or both, occupy a „shadow economy 
position“. Why do people work in the shadow economy? In the official labor market, the 
costs firms (and individuals) have to pay when “officially” hiring someone are increased 
tremendously by the burden of tax and social contributions on wages, as well as by the legal 
administrative regulation to control economic activity.8) In various OECD countries, these 
costs are greater than the wage effectively earned by the worker – providing a strong 
                                                          
7)Pioneering work in this area has been done by L. Frey (1972, 1975, 1978, 1980), Cappiello (1986), Lubell 
(1991), Pozo (1996), Bartlett (1998) and Tanzi (1999). 
8)This is especially true in Europe (e.g. in Germany and Austria), where the total tax and social security burden 
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incentive to work in the shadow economy. More detailed theoretical information on the labor 
supply decision in the underground economy is given by Lemieux, Fortin, and Fréchette 
(1994) who use micro data from a survey conducted in Quebec City (Canada). In particular, 
their study provides some economic insight into the size of the distortion caused by income 
taxation and the welfare system. The results of this study suggest that hours worked in the 
shadow economy are quite responsive to changes in the net wage in the regular (official) 
sector. Their empirical results attribute this to a (miss-)allocation of work from the official to 
the informal sector, where it is not taxed. In this case, the substitution between labor-market 
activities in the two sectors is quite high. These empirical findings clearly indicate, that 
“participation rates and hours worked in the underground sector also tend to be inversely 
related to the number of hours worked in the regular sector“ (Lemieux, Fortin, and Fréchette 
1994 p. 235). These findings demonstrate a large negative elasticity of hours worked in the 
shadow economy with respect both to the wage rate in the regular sector as well as to a high 
mobility between the sectors. 
 
 
Illicit work can take many shapes. The underground use of labor may consist of a second job 
after (or even during) regular working hours. A second form is shadow economy work by 
individuals who do not participate in the official labor market. A third component is the 
employment of people (e.g. clandestine or illegal immigrants), who are not allowed to work 
in the official economy. Empirical research on the shadow economy labor market is even 
more difficult than of the shadow economy on the value added, since one has very little 
knowledge about how many hours an average “shadow economy worker” is actually working 
(from full time to a few hours, only); hence, it is not easy to provide empirical facts.9) 
 
 
Table 9 
 
 
In table 9 the estimates for the shadow economy labor force in 7 OECD-countries (Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) are shown. In Austria the shadow 
economy labor force has reached in the years 1997-1998 500.000 to 750.000 or 16% of the 
official labor force (mean value). In Denmark the development of the 80s and 90s shows that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
adds up to 100% on top of the wage effectively earned; see also section 5.1. 
9)For developing countries some literature about the shadow labour market exists, e.g. the latest works by 
Dallago (1990), Pozo (1996), Loayza (1996), especially Chickering and Salahdine (1991). 
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the part of the Danish population engaged in the shadow economy ranged from 8.3% of the 
total labor force (in 1980) to 15.4% in 1994 – quite a remarkable increase of the shadow 
economy labor force; it almost doubled over 15 years. In France (in the years 1997/98) the 
shadow economy labor force reached a size of between 6 and 12% of the official labor force 
or in absolute figures between 1.4 and 3.2 million. In Germany this figure rose from 8 to 12% 
in 1974 to 1982 and to 22% (18 millions) in the year 1997/98. For France and Germany this is 
again a very strong increase in the shadow economy labor force. In other countries the 
amount of the shadow economy labor force is quite large, too: in Italy 30-48% (1997-1998), 
Spain 11.5-32% (1997-1998) and Sweden 19.8 % (1997-1998). In the European Union about 
30 million people are engaged in shadow economy activities in the year 1997-1998 and in all 
European OECD-countries 48 million work illicitly.  
 
 
These figures demonstrate that the shadow economy labor market is lively and may provide 
an explanation, why for example in Germany, one can observe such a high and persistent 
unemployment. In table 9 a first and preliminary calculation is done of the official GNP per 
capita and the shadow economy GDP per capita, shown in US-$. Here one realizes 
immediately that in all countries investigated, the shadow economy GDP per capita is much 
higher - on average in all countries around 40%.10) This clearly shows, that the productivity in 
the shadow economy quite likely is considerably higher then the official economy - a clear 
indication, that the work effort; i.e. the incentive to work effectively is stronger in the shadow 
economy. In general these very preliminary results clearly demonstrate that the shadow 
economy labor force has reached a remarkable size in the developed OECD-countries, too, 
even when the calculation still might have many errors, but again the picture shows, that the 
shadow economy labor market has reached a sizeable figure in most countries. 
 
                                                          
10) This is an astonishing result, which has to be further checked, because in the official per capita GDP figures 
the whole economy is included with quite productive sectors (like electronics, steel, machinery, etc.) and the 
shadow economy figures traditionally contain mostly the service sectors (and the construction sector). Hence 
one could also expect exactly the opposite result, as the productivity in the service sector is usually much lower 
than in the above mentioned ones. Sources of error may be either an underestimation of the shadow economy 
labor force or an overestimation of the shadow economy in terms of value added. 
23.08.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld.doc  25 
Table 9: Estimates of the Size of the “Shadow Economy Labor Force” and of the Official and Shadow Economy Productivity in Some 
OECD Countries 1974-1998 
Countries Year 
 
Official GDP 
per capita in 
US-$1) 
Shadow 
Economy 
GDP in US-$ 
per capita 
Size of the 
Shadow Economy 
(in % of official 
GDP) Currency 
Demand 
Approach2) 
Shadow 
Economy 
Labor Force in 
1000 people3) 
Shadow 
Economy 
Participants in 
% of official 
Labor Force4) 
Sources of Shadow Economy Labour 
Force 
Austria 90-91 
97-98 
20,636 
25,874 
25,382 
29,630 
5.47 
8.93 
300-380 
500-750 
9.6 
16.0 
Schneider (1998) and  
own calculations 
Denmark 1980 13,233 18,658 8.6 250 8.3 Mogensen, et. al.  
 1986 18,496 26,356 9.8 390 13.0 (1995) 
 1991 25,946 36,558 11.2 410 14.3 and own calculations 
 1994 34,441 48,562 17.6 420 15.4  
France 1975-82 
1997-98 
12,539 
24,363 
17,542 
34,379 
6.9 
14.9 
800-1500 
1400-3200 
3.0-6.0 
6.0-12.0 
De Grazia (1983) and 
own calculations 
Germany 1974-82 
1997-98 
11,940 
26,080 
17,911 
39,634 
10.6 
14.7 
3000-4000 
7000-9000 
8.0-12.0 
19.0-23.0 
De Grazia (1983), F. Schneider (1998b) 
and own calculations 
Italy 1979 
1997-98 
8,040 
20,361 
11,736 
29,425 
16.7 
27.3 
4000-7000 
6600-11400 
20.0-35.0 
30.0-48.0 
Gaetani and d’Aragona (1979) and 
 own calculations 
Spain 1979-80 
1997-98 
5,640 
13,791 
7,868 
19,927 
19.0 
23.1 
1250-3500 
1500-4200 
9.6-26.5 
11.5-32.3 
Ruesga (1984) and 
own calculations 
Sweden 1978 
1997-98 
15,107 
25,685 
21,981 
37,331 
13.0 
19.8 
750 
1150 
13.0-14.0 
19.8 
De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
European 
Union 
1978 
1997-98 
9,930 
22,179 
14,458 
32,226 
14.5 
19.6 
15 000 
30 000 
- 
 
De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
OECD 
(Europe) 
1978 
1997-98 
9,576 
22,880 
14,162 
33,176 
15.0 
20.2 
26 000 
48 000 
- De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
1) Source: OECD, Paris, various years 
2) Source: Own calculations. 
3) Estimated full-time jobs, including unregistered workers, illegal immigrants, and second jobs. 
4) In percent of the population aged 20-69, survey method.  
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4 The Main Causes of the Increase of the Shadow Economy 
4.1 Increase of the Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
In almost all studies11) it has been found out, that the increase of the tax and social security 
contribution burdens is one of the main causes for the increase of the shadow economy. Since 
taxes affect labor-leisure choices, and also stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy, or 
the untaxed sector of the economy, the distortion of this choice is a major concern of 
economists. The bigger the difference between the total cost of labor in the official economy 
and the after-tax earnings (from work), the greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and 
to work in the shadow economy. Since this difference depends broadly on the social security 
system and the overall tax burden, they are key features of the existence and the increase of 
the shadow economy. But even major tax reforms with major tax rate deductions will not lead 
to a substantial decrease of the shadow economy. They will only be able to stabilize the size 
of the shadow economy and avoid a further increase. Social networks and personal 
relationships, the high profit from irregular activities and associated investments in real and 
human capital are strong ties which prevent people from transferring to the official economy. 
For Canada, Spiro (1993) expected similar reactions of people facing an increase in indirect 
taxes (VAT, GST). After the introduction of the GST in 1991 - in the midst of a recession - , 
the individuals, suffering economic hardship because of the recession, turned to the shadow 
economy, which led to a substantial loss in tax revenue. “Unfortunately, once this habit is 
developed, it is unlikely that it will be abandoned merely because economic growth resumes.“ 
(Spiro 1993 p. 255). They may not return to the formal sector, even in the long run. This fact 
makes it even more difficult for politicians to carry out major reforms because they may not 
gain a lot from them.12) 
 
The most important factor in neoclassical models is the marginal tax rate. The higher the 
marginal tax rate, the greater is the substitution effect and the bigger the distortion of the 
labor-leisure decision. Especially when taking into account that the individual can also receive 
income in the shadow economy, the substitution effect is definitely larger than the income 
                                                          
11) See Thomas (1992); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994, 1997, 1998, 2000); Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,1998b); Tanzi (1999) and Giles (1999a) just to quote a few recent ones. 
12)See Schneider (1994b, 1998b) for a similar result of the effects of a major tax reform in Austria on the shadow 
economy. Schneider shows that a major reduction in the direct tax burden did not lead to a major reduction in the 
shadow economy. Because legal tax avoidance was abolished and other factors, like regulations, were not 
changed; hence for a considerable part of the tax payers the actual tax and regulation burden remained 
unchanged. 
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effect13) and, hence, the individual works less in the official sector. The overall efficiency of 
the economy is, therefore (ceteris paribus), lower and the distortion leads to a welfare loss 
(according to official GNP and taxation.) But the welfare might also be viewed as increasing, 
if the welfare of those, who are working in the shadow economy, were taken into account, 
too.14) 
Empirical results of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy is provided in the 
studies of Schneider (1994b, 2000) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 
1998b); they all found strong evidence for the general influence of taxation on the shadow 
economy. This strong influence of indirect and direct taxation on the shadow economy will be 
further demonstrated by discussing empirical results in the case of Austria and the 
Scandinavian countries. For Austria the driving force for the shadow economy activities is the 
direct tax burden (including social security payments), it has the biggest influence, followed 
by the intensity of regulation and complexity of the tax system. A similar result has been 
achieved by Schneider (1986) for the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). In all three countries various tax variables (average direct tax rate, average total tax 
rate (indirect and direct tax rate)) and marginal tax rates have the expected positive sign (on 
currency demand) and are highly statistically significant. Similar results are reached by 
Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) for Germany and by Kloveland (1984) for Norway and Sweden. 
Several other recent studies provide further evidence of the influence of income tax rates on 
the shadow economy: Cebula (1997), using Feige data for the shadow economy, found 
evidence of the impact of government income tax rates, IRS audit probabilities, and IRS 
penalty policies on the relative size of the shadow economy in the United States. Cebula 
concludes that a restraint of any further increase of the top marginal income tax rate may at 
least not lead to a further increase of the shadow economy, while increased IRS audits and 
penalties might reduce the size of the shadow economy. His findings indicate that there is 
generally a strong influence of state activities on the size of the shadow economy: For 
example, if the marginal federal personal income tax rate increases by one percentage point, 
ceteris paribus, the shadow economy rises by 1.4 percentage points. In another investigation, 
Hill and Kabir (1996) found empirical evidence that marginal tax rates are more relevant than 
average tax rates, and that a substitution of direct taxes by indirect taxes seems unlikely to 
improve tax compliance. Further evidence on the effect of taxation on the shadow economy is 
                                                          
13)If leisure is assumed to be a normal good. 
14)See Thomas (1992) p. 134-7. 
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presented by Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b), who come to the conclusion 
that it is not higher tax rates per se that increase the size of the shadow economy, but the 
ineffective and discretionary application of the tax system and the regulations by 
governments. Their finding, that there is a negative correlation15) between the size of the 
unofficial economy and the top (marginal) tax rates, might be unexpected. But since other 
factors like tax deductibility, tax relives, tax exemptions, the choice between different tax 
systems, and various other options for legal tax avoidance were not taken into account, it is 
not all that surprising.16) On the other side Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b) 
find a positive correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the corporate tax 
burden. They come to the overall conclusion that there is a large difference between the 
impact of either direct taxes or the corporate tax burden. Institutional aspects, like the 
efficiency of the administration, the extent of control rights held by politicians and 
bureaucrats, and the amount of bribery and especially corruption, therefore, play a major role 
in this “bargaining game“ between the government and the taxpayers. 
 
In table 10 it is tried to provide an explanation of the different sizes of the shadow economies 
of some of the 21 OECD countries by comparing the overall tax and social security 
contributions with the size of the shadow economy of the different countries for the year 
1996. 
 
Table 10 
 
With the exception of Spain (shadow economy 22.9 %, tax and social security burden 67.2 
%), Greece, Italy, Belgium and Sweden, who have the largest shadow economies in 1996 also 
have the highest tax and social security burden (72.3, 72.9, 76.0 and 78.6%), whereas the 
countries like Switzerland and U.S., who have the lowest overall tax and social security 
burden (39.7 and 41.4%) they have the lowest shadow economies with 7.5 and 8.8%, too! Of 
course, there are exceptions, like  the United Kingdom and Austria with a quite high overall 
tax and social security burden (54.9 and 70.4%) and a quite low shadow economy (13.1 and 
                                                          
15)The higher the top marginal tax rate, the lower the size of the shadow economy. 
16)Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) found a similar result in a cross country analysis 
that higher tax rates are associated with less official activity as percent of GDP. They argue entrepreneurs go 
underground not to avoid official taxes but they want to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. 
However looking at their empirical (regression) results the finding that higher tax rates are correlated with a 
lower share of the unofficial economy is not very robust and in most cases, using different tax rates, they do not 
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8.3%), but the overall pictures seems to fit, the higher the overall social security and tax 
burden, the higher the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. The strong positive relationship that 
a rising tax and social security contribution burdens cause a higher shadow economy, is also 
demonstrated in figures 7.1 and 7.2 
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 
 
If one calculates the correlation coefficient between the tax and social security  contribution 
burden and the size of the shadow economy, the coefficient has a value of 0.61, which is 
clearly statistically significant from zero. 
 
4.2 Intensity of Regulations 
The increase of the intensity of regulations (often measured in the numbers of laws and 
regulations, like licenses requirements) is another important factor, which reduces the 
freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy.17) One can think of labor 
market regulations, trade barriers, and labor restrictions for foreigners. Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b) find an overall significant empirical evidence of the influence of 
(labor) regulations on the shadow economy, the impact is clearly described and theoretically 
derived in other studies, e.g. for Germany (Deregulation Commission 1990/91). Regulations 
lead to a substantial increase in labor costs in the official economy. But since most of these 
costs can be shifted on the employees, these costs provide another incentive to work in the 
shadow economy, where they can be avoided. Empirical evidence supporting the model of 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), which predicts, inter alia, that countries with more 
general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the unofficial economy in 
total GDP, is found in their empirical analysis. A one-point increase of the regulation index 
(ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most regulation in a country), ceteris paribus, is associated 
with an 8.1 percentage point increase in the share of the shadow economy, when controlled 
for GDP per capita (Johnson et. al. (1998b), p. 18). They conclude that it is the enforcement 
of regulation, which is the key factor for the burden levied on firms and individuals, and not 
the overall extent of regulation - mostly not enforced - which drive firms into the shadow 
economy. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) reach a similar result. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
find a statistically significant result. 
17)See for a (social) psychological, theoretical foundation of this feature, Brehm (1966, 1972), and for a (first) 

23.08.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld.doc  31 
Table 10: The Size of the Shadow Economy and the Burden of Taxes and Social Security Contributions in OECD 
countries 
 
Size of the 
shadow 
economy (in 
% of GDP) 
Value added 
tax rate (in 
%)1) 
Average 
direct tax 
rate  
(in %)2) 
Social security 
contributions 
by employees 
rate 3) 
(in %)  
Social security 
contributions 
by employers 
rate 3) 
(in %) 
Total social 
security 
contributions 
rate 
(in %) 
sum of (4)+(5)
Total social 
security 
contributions + 
direct tax 
burden: sum 
(4)+(5)+(3) 
(in %) 
Total tax 
and social 
security 
burden: 
sum 
(2)+(3)+ 
 (4)+(5) 
1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Greece 28.5 18.0 11.0 15.8 27.5 43.3 54.3 72.3 
Italy 27.0 19.0 12.0 9.9 32.0 41.9 53.9 72.9 
Spain 22.9 16.0 13.0 6.6 31.6 38.2 51.2 67.2 
Belgium 21.9 21.0 19.0 10.0 26.0 36.0 55.0 76.0 
Sweden 19.2 25.0 20.0 4.0 29.6 33.6 53.6 78.6 
Norway 18.9 23.0 19.0 7.0 12.8 19.8 38.8 61.8 
Denmark 18.3 25.0 36.0 9.0 0.0 9.0 45.0 70.0 
Ireland 15.9 21.0 20.0 7.2 12.3 19.5 39.5 60.5 
Canada 14.6 7.0 21.0 7.0 8.0 15.0 36.0 43.0 
Germany 14.5 15.0 18.0 16.1 16.1 32.2 50.2 65.2 
France 14.3 20.6 6.0 13.0 31.0 44.0 50.0 70.6 
Netherlands 14.0 17.5 10.0 31.0 8.8 39.8 49.8 67.3 
U.K. 13.1 17.5 16.0 10.7 10.2 21.4 37.4 54.9 
USA 8.8 3.0 17.0 7.6 13.8 21.4 38.4 41.4 
Austria 8.3 20.0 8.0 18.2 24.2 42.4 50.4 70.4 
Switzerland 7.5 6.5 10.0 11.6 11.6 23.2 33.2 39.7 
 
1) Rates of the year 1996; USA: Average sales tax 
2) Average direct tax rate is calculated as the sum of all income taxes (+ payroll and manpower taxes) paid on wages and salaries (including income of self-employed) 
divided by gross labor costs of an average income earner. 
3) The rate is calculated on the basis of the annual gross earnings of an average income earner. 
Source: Own calculations and OECD-working paper 176, 1997, Paris. 
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Figure 2.1: Size of the Shadow Economy vs Total Soc. Security 
Contributions + Direct Tax Burden*, Year 1996
(Correlation Coefficient with AT = 0,61, without AT = 0,72)
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Figure 2.2: Size of the Shadow Economy vs 
Total Tax* and Soc. Security Burden, Year 1996 
(Correlation Coefficient with AT = 0,62, without AT = 0,74)
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In their study every available measure of regulation is significantly correlated with the share 
of the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship is unambiguous: more regulation is 
correlated with a larger shadow economy. A one point increase in an index of regulation 
(ranging from 1-5) is associated with a 10 % increase in the shadow economy for 76 
developing, transition and developed countries. 
 
These findings demonstrate that governments should put more emphasis on improving 
enforcement of laws and regulations, rather than increasing their number. Some governments, 
however, prefer this policy option (more regulations and laws), when trying to reduce the 
shadow economy, mostly because it leads to an increase in power of the bureaucrats and to a 
higher rate of employment in the public sector. 
4.3 Public Sector Services 
An increase of the shadow economy leads to reduced state revenues which in turn reduces the 
quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this can lead to an 
increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, quite often combined 
with a deterioration in the quality of the public goods (such as the public infrastructure) and of 
the administration, with the consequence of even stronger incentives to participate in the 
shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b) present a simple model of 
this relationship. Their findings show that smaller shadow economies appear in countries with 
higher tax revenues, if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations and less 
bribery facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of the law, which is financed by tax 
revenues, also have smaller shadow economies. Transition countries have higher levels of 
regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of bribery, higher effective taxes on 
official activities and a large discretionary framework of regulations and consequently to a 
higher shadow economy. The overall conclusion is that “wealthier countries of the OECD, as 
well as some in Eastern Europe find themselves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low 
tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption 
control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of countries in Latin 
American and the Former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a ‘bad 
equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule of law is 
weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the 
unofficial economy.“ (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 1998a p. I). 
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5 Methods to Estimate the Size of the Shadow Economy 18) 
As has already been mentioned in chapter 2 to undertake attempts to measure the size of a 
shadow economy is a difficult and challenging task. In this chapter a comprehensive overview 
is given about the current knowledge of the various procedures to estimate the shadow 
economy. To measure the size and development of the shadow economy three different types 
of methods are most widely used. They are briefly discussed in the following three 
subsections. 
5.1 Direct Approaches 
These are micro approaches which employ either well designed surveys and samples based on 
voluntary replies or tax auditing and other compliance methods. Sample surveys designed for 
estimation of the shadow economy are widely used in a number of countries19) to measure the 
shadow economy. The main disadvantage of this method is that it presents the flaws of all 
surveys: average precision and results depend greatly on the respondents willingness to 
cooperate. It is difficult to asses the rise of the undeclared work from a direct questionnaire. 
Most interviewed hesitate to confess a fraudulent behavior and quite often responses are 
rarely reliable so that it is difficult, from this type of answers, to calculate a real estimate – in 
monetary terms – of the extend of undeclared work. The main advantage of this method lies in 
the detailed information about the structure of the shadow economy, but the results from these 
kinds of surveys are very sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated20). 
 
Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy between income 
declared for tax purposes and that measured by selective checks. Fiscal auditing programs 
have been particularly effective in this regard. Designed to measure the amount of undeclared 
taxable income, they have been used to calculate the shadow economy in several countries.21) 
A number of difficulties beset this approach. Firstly, using tax compliance data is equivalent 
to using a (possibly biased) sample of the population. However, since in general a selection of 
                                                          
18) This chapter closely follows Schneider and Enste (2000). 
19)The direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway by Isachsen, Klovland 
and Strom (1982), and Isachsen and Strom (1985). For Denmark this method is used by Mogensen (et. al., 1995) 
in which they report „estimates“ of the shadow economy of 2.7 percent of GDP for 1989, of 4.2 percent of GDP 
for 1991, of 3.0 percent of GDP for 1993 and of 3.1 percent of GDP for 1994.  
20)The advantages and disadvantages of this method are extensively dealt by Mogensen et. al (1995) in their 
excellent and very carefully done investigation. 
21)In the United States, IRS (1979, 1983), Simon and Witte (1982), Witte (1987), Clotefelter (1983), and Feige 
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tax payers for tax audit is not random, but based on properties of submitted (tax) returns 
which indicate a certain likelihood of (tax) fraud, such a sample is not a random one of the 
whole population. This factor is likely to bias compliance – based estimates of the black 
economy. Secondly, estimates based on tax audits reflect that portion of black economy 
income which the authorities succeeded in discovering and this is likely to be only a fraction 
of hidden income. 
 
A further disadvantage of the two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is that they lead 
only to point estimates. Moreover, it is unlikely that they capture all „shadow“ activities, so 
they can be seen as providing lower bound estimates. They are unable (at least at present) to 
provide estimates of the development and growth of the shadow economy over a longer 
period of time. As already argued, they have, however at least one considerable advantage - 
they can provide detailed information about shadow economy activities and the structure and 
composition of those who work in the shadow economy. 
5.2 Indirect Approaches 
These approaches, which are also called „indicator“ approaches, are mostly macroeconomic 
ones and use various economic and other indicators that contain information about the 
development of the shadow economy (over time). Currently there are five indicators which 
leave some „traces“ of the development of the shadow economy:  
 
5.2.1 The Discrepancy between National Expenditure and Income Statistics 
This approach is based on discrepancies between income and expenditure statistics. In 
national accounting the income measure of GNP should be equal to the expenditure measure 
of GNP. Thus, if an independent estimate of the expenditure site of the national accounts is 
available, the gap between the expenditure measure and the income measure can be used as an 
indicator of the extend of the black economy.22) However, since national accounts statisticians 
will be anxious to minimize this discrepancy, the initial discrepancy or first estimate, rather 
than the published discrepancy should be employed for this purpose. If all the components of 
the expenditure site where measured without error, then this approach would indeed yield a 
good estimate of the scale of the shadow economy. However, unfortunately, this is not the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992). 
22) See, e.g., Franz (1983) for Austria; MacAfee (1980) O’Higgins (1989) and Smith (1985), for Great Britain; 
Petersen (1982) and Del Boca (1981) for Germany; Park (1979) for the United States. For a survey and critical 
remarks, see Thomas (1992). 
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case and the discrepancy, therefore, reflects all omissions and errors everywhere in the 
national accounts statistics as well as the shadow economy activity. These estimates may 
therefore be very crude and of questionable reliability.23)  
5.2.2 The Discrepancy between the Official and Actual Labor Force  
A decline in participation of the labor force in the official economy can be seen as an 
indication of increased activity in the shadow economy. If total labor force participation is 
assumed to be constant, a decreasing official rate of participation can be seen as an indicator 
of an increase in the activities in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.24) The weakness of this 
method is that differences in the rate of participation may also have other causes. Moreover, 
people can work in the shadow economy and have a job in the „official’ economy. Therefore 
such estimates may be viewed as weak indicators of the size and development of the shadow 
economy. 
5.2.3 The Transactions Approach 
This approach has been developed by Feige.25) It assumes, that there is a constant relation 
over time between the volume of transaction and official GNP. Feige’s approach therefore 
starts from Fisher’s quantity equation, M*V = p*T (with M = money, V = velocity, p = prices, 
and T = total transactions). Assumptions have to be made about the velocity of money and 
about the relationships between the value of total transactions (p*T) and total (=official + 
unofficial) nominal GNP. Relating total nominal GNP to total transactions, the GNP of the 
shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting the official GNP from total nominal GNP. 
However, to derive figures for the shadow economy, Feige has to assume a base year in which 
there is no shadow economy, and therefore the ratio of p*T to total nominal (official = total) 
GNP was „normal“ and would have been constant over time, if there had been no shadow 
economy. This method, too, has several weaknesses: for instance, the assumption of a base 
year with no shadow economy, and the assumption of a „normal“ ratio of transactions 
constant over time. Moreover, to obtain reliable shadow economy estimates, precise figures of 
the total volume of transactions should be available. This availability might be especially 
difficult to achieve for cash transactions, because they depend, among other factors, on the 
                                                          
23) A related approach is pursued by Pissarides and Weber (1988), who use micro data from household budget 
surveys to estimate the extend of income understatement by self-employed. Also in this micro approach more or 
less the same difficulties arise and the figures calculated for the shadow economies may be crude. 
24) Such studies have been made for Italy, see e.g., Contini (1981) and Del Boca (1981); for the United States, 
see O’Neill (1983), for a survey and critical remarks, see Thomas (1992). 
25) For an extended description of this approach, see Feige (1996); for a further application for the Netherlands, 
Boeschoten and Fase (1984), and for Germany, Langfeldt (1984). 
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durability of bank notes, in terms of the quality of the papers on which they are printed.26) 
Also, in this approach the assumption is made that all variations in the ratio between the total 
value of transaction and the officially measured GNP are due to the shadow economy. This 
means that a considerable amount of data is required in order to eliminate financial 
transactions from “pure” cross payments, which are totally legal and have nothing to do with 
the shadow economy. In general, although this approach is theoretically attractive, the 
empirical requirements necessary to obtain reliable estimates are so difficult to fulfil, that its 
application may lead to doubtful results. 
5.2.4 The Currency Demand Approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation 
of the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow economy) for the 
United States over the period 1919 to 1955. 20 years later, Gutmann (1977) used the same 
approach, but did not use any statistical procedures; instead he „only“ looked at the ratio 
between currency and demand deposits over the years 1937 to 1976.  
 
Cagan’s approach was further developed by Tanzi (1980, 1983), who econometrically 
estimated a currency demand function for the United States for the period 1929 to 1980 in 
order to calculate the shadow economy. His approach assumes that shadow (or hidden) 
transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable traces 
for the authorities. An increase in the size of the shadow economy will therefore increase the 
demand for currency. To isolate the resulting „excess“ demand for currency, an equation for 
currency demand is econometrically estimated over time. All conventional possible factors, 
such as the development of income, payment habits, interest rates, and so on, are controlled 
for. Additionally, such variables as the direct and indirect tax burden, government regulation 
and the complexity of the tax system, which are assumed to be the major factors causing 
people to work in the shadow economy, are included in the estimation equation. The basic 
regression equation for the currency demand, proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following:  
 
ln (C / M2)t = βO + β1 ln (1 + TW)t + β2 ln (WS / Y)t + β3 ln Rt + β4 ln (Y / N)t + ut 
with β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0, β4 > 0 
 
where  
 
                                                          
26)For a detailed criticism of the transaction approach see Boeschoten and Fase (1984), Frey and Pommerehne 
(1984), Kirchgaessner (1984), Tanzi (1982, 1986), Dallago (1990), Thomas (1986, 1992, 1999) and Giles 
(1999a). 
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ln denotes natural logarithms,  
C / M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts,  
TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy),  
WS / Y is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment 
and money holding patterns),  
R is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and  
Y / N is the per capita income.27)  
 
The „excess“ increase in currency, which is the amount unexplained by the conventional or 
normal factors (mentioned above) is then attributed to the rising tax burden and the other 
reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for the size and development 
of the shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by comparing the difference between 
the development of currency when the direct and indirect tax burden (and government 
regulations) are held at its lowest value, and the development of currency with the current 
(much higher) burden of taxation and government regulations. Assuming in a second step the 
same income velocity for currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official 
economy, the size of the shadow can be computed and compared to the official GDP. 
 
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used approaches. It has been 
applied to many OECD countries,28) but has nevertheless been criticized on various 
grounds.29) The most commonly raised objections to this method are:  
 
(i) Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and Strom 
(1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 80 percent 
of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total shadow 
economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. 
(ii) Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause of the 
shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ attitudes 
toward the state, „tax morality“ and so on) are not considered, because reliable data 
for most countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have an 
                                                          
27) The estimation of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by Thomas (1999) but part of this 
criticism has been considered by the work of Giles (1999a, 1999b) and Bhattacharyya (1999), who both use the 
latest econometric technics. 
28)See Schneider (1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a), and Williams and Windebank 
(1995).  
29)See Thomas (1992, 1999), Feige (1986), and Pozo (1996). 
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impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than reported in 
most studies.30) 
(iii) A further weakness of this approach, at least when applied to the United States, is 
discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996), who point out that 
increases in currency demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand 
deposits rather than to an increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow 
economy.  
(iv) Blades (1982) and Feige (1986, 1996), criticize Tanzi’s studies on the grounds that the 
US dollar is used as an international currency. Tanzi should have considered (and 
controlled for) the US dollars, which are used as an international currency and held in 
cash abroad.31) Moreover, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) and Thomas (1986, 1992, 
1999) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very stable.32) 
(v) Another weak point of this procedure, in most studies, is the assumption of the same 
velocity of money in both types of economies. As Hill and Kabir (1996) for Canada 
and Klovland (1984) for the Scandinavian countries argue, there is already 
considerable uncertainty about the velocity of money in the official economy; the 
velocity of money in the hidden sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without 
knowledge about the velocity of currency in the shadow economy, one has to accept 
the assumption of an „equal“ money velocity in both sectors. 
(vi) Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. 
Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the figures 
attained in the bulk of the studies already undertaken. 
                                                          
30)One (weak) justification for the use of only the tax variable is that this variable has by far the strongest impact 
on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only exception is the study by Frey 
and Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable „tax immorality“ has a quantitatively larger and statistically 
stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model approach. In the study of Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1985), for the U.S., besides various tax measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, minimum wage rates are 
available, the tax variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60-70 percent to the size of the 
shadow economy. See also Zilberfarb (1986). 
31) In another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. pp. 110-113) he explicitly deals with this criticism. A very careful 
investigation of the amount of US-$ used abroad and the US currency used in the shadow economy and to 
"classical" crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998), who concludes that large denomination bills 
are major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and classical crime activities due to reduced 
transactions costs. 
32) However in studies for European countries Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) and Schneider (1986) reach the 
conclusion that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust when using 
the currency demand method. Hill and Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the shadow economy varies 
with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude „when the theoretically best tax rates are selected and a range 
of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates underground economic growth between 1964 and 
1995 at between 3 and 11 percent of GDP.“ (Hill and Kabir [1996, p. 1553]).  
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5.2.5 The Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method 
(1) The Kaufmann - Kaliberda Method33) 
To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) assume that electric-power consumption is regarded as the single best 
physical indicator of overall economic activity. Overall (official and unofficial) economic 
activity and electricity consumption have been empirically observed throughout the world to 
move in lockstep with an electricity/GDP elasticity usually close to one. By having a proxy 
measurement for the overall economy and subtracting it from estimates of official GDP, 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda derive an estimate of unofficial GDP. This means, that Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda suggest, that the growth of total electricity consumption is an indicator for 
representing a growth of official and unofficial GDP. According to this approach, the 
difference between the gross rate of registered (official) GDP and the cross rate of total 
electricity consumption can be attributed to the growth of the shadow economy. This method 
is very simple and appealing, however, it can also be criticized on various grounds: 
 
(i) Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity (e.g. 
personal services), and other energy sources can be used (gas, oil, coal, etc.), so that 
only a part of the shadow economy will be captured. 
(ii) Over time, there has been considerable technical progress. Both the production and 
use of electricity are more efficient than in the past, and that will apply in both official 
and unofficial uses. 
(iii) There may be considerable differences or changes in the elasticity of electricity/GDP 
across countries and over time.34) 
 
(2) The Lackó Method 
Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999) assumes that a certain part of the shadow economy is associated 
with the household consumption of electricity. It comprises, among others, the so-called 
household production, do-it-yourself activities, and other non registered production and 
services. Lackó assumes that in countries where the section of the shadow economy 
associated with the household electricity consumption is high, the rest of the hidden economy, 
                                                          
33)This method was used earlier by Lizzeri (1979), Del Boca and Forte (1982), and then was used much later by 
Portes (1996), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997). For a critique see 
Lackó (1998). 
34)Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) make an attempt to adjust for changes in the elasticity of 
electricity/GDP. 
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that is the part Lackó cannot measure, will also be high. Lackó (1996, pp.19 ff.) assumes that 
in each country a part of the household consumption of electricity is used in the shadow 
economy.  
 
Lackó’s approach (1998, p.133) can be described by the following two equations: 
ln Ei = α1 ln Ci + α2 ln PRi + α3 Gi + α4 Qi + α5 Hi + ui (1) 
with    α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0, α4 < 0, α5 > 0 
Hi = β1 Ti + β2 (Si – Ti) + β3 Di    (2) 
with β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 > 0 
where 
i: the number assigned to the country, 
Ei: per capita household electricity consumption in country i in Mtoe, 
Ci: per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of electricity in 
country i in US dollars (at purchasing power parity), 
PRi: the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential electricity in US dollars (at 
purchasing power parity), 
Gi: the relative frequency of months with the need of heating in houses in country i, 
Qi: the ratio of energy sources other than electricity energy to all energy sources in household 
energy consumption, 
Hi: the per capita output of the hidden economy, 
Ti: the ratio of the sum of paid personal income, corporate profit and taxes on goods and 
services to GDP, 
Si: the ratio of public social welfare expenditures to GDP, and 
Di: the sum on number of dependants over 14 years and of inactive earners, both per 100 
active earners. 
 
In a cross country study, she econometrically estimates equation (1) substituting Hi by 
equation (2). The econometric estimation results can then be used to establish an ordering of 
the countries with respect to electricity use in their shadow economies. For the calculation of 
the actual size (value added) of the shadow economy, Lackó should know how much GDP is 
produced by one unit of electricity in the shadow economy of each country. Since these data 
are not known, she takes the result of one of the known shadow economy estimations, that 
were carried out for a market economy with another approach for the early 1990s, and she 
applies this proportion to the other countries. Lackó used the shadow economy of the United 
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States as such a base (the shadow economy value of 10.5% of GDP taken from 
Morris(1993)), and then she calculates the size of the shadow economy for other countries. 
Lackó's method is also open to criticism: 
(i) Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity and 
other energy sources can be used. 
(ii) Shadow economy activities do not take place only in the household sector. 
(iii) It is doubtful whether the ratio of social welfare expenditures can be used as the 
explanatory factor for the shadow economy, especially in transition and developing 
countries. 
(iv) It is questionable which is the most reliable base value of the shadow economy in 
order to calculate the size of the shadow economy for all other countries, especially, 
for the transition and developing countries.  
 
5.3 The model approach35 
All methods described so far that are designed to estimate the size and development of the 
shadow economy consider just one indicator that “must” capture all effects of the shadow 
economy. However, it is obvious that its effects show up simultaneously in the production, 
labor, and money markets. An even more important critique is that the causes which 
determine the size of the hidden economy are taken into account only in some of the monetary 
approach studies which usually consider one cause, the burden of taxation. The model 
approach explicitly considers multiple causes leading to the existence and growth as well as 
the multiple effects of the shadow economy over time. The empirical method used is quite 
different from those used so far. It is based on the statistical theory of unobserved variables, 
which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be measured. 
For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach is used to measure the hidden economy as an 
unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural 
equations within which the “unobserved” variable cannot be measured directly. The 
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model consists in general of two 
parts, the measurement model links the unobserved variables to observed indicators. The 
                                                          
35)This part is a summarized version from a longer study by Aigner, Schneider, and Ghosh (1988, p. 303), 
applying this approach for the United States over time. The pioneers of this approach are Weck (1983), Frey and 
Weck-Hannemann (1984), who applied this approach to cross-section data from the 24 OECD countries for 
various years. Before turning to this approach they developed the concept of „soft modeling“ (Frey, Weck, and 
Pommerehne (1982), Frey and Weck (1983a and 1983b)), an approach which has been used to provide a ranking 
of the relative size of the shadow economy in different countries. 
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structural equations model specifies causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In 
this case, there is one unobserved variable, the size of the shadow economy. It is assumed to 
be influenced by a set of indicators for the shadow economy’s size, thus capturing the 
structural dependence of the shadow economy on variables that may be useful in predicting its 
movement and size in the future. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., 
k) the size of the shadow economy Xt, and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in Figure 
8. 
 
Figure 8: Development of the shadow economy over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a large body of literature36) on the possible causes and indicators of the shadow 
economy, in which the following three types of causes are distinguished: 
 
Causes 
(i) The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived: a rising burden 
of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy. 
(ii) The burden of regulation as proxy for all other state activities: it is assumed that 
increases in the burden of regulation give a strong incentive to enter the shadow 
economy. 
(iii) The „tax morality“ (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness 
of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the shadow 
                                                          
36)Thomas (1992); Schneider (1994a, 1997); Pozo (1996); Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 
1998b); and Giles (1999a, 1999b). 
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economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to increase the size of the 
shadow economy.37) 
 
Indicators 
A change in the size of the shadow economy may be reflected in the following indicators: 
(i) Development of monetary indicators: if activities in the shadow economy rise, 
additional monetary transactions are required. 
(ii) Development of the labor market: increasing participation of workers in the hidden 
sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy. Similarly, 
increased activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected in shorter 
working hours in the official economy. 
(iii) Development of the production market: an increase in the shadow economy means 
that inputs (especially labor) move out of the official economy (at least partly); this 
displacement might have a depressing effect on the official growth rate of the 
economy. 
 
The latest use of the model approach has been undertaken by Giles (1999a, 1999b) and by 
Giles, Linsey and Gupsa (1999), and Giles and Tedd (2002). They basically estimates a 
comprehensive (dynamic) MIMIC model to get a time serious index of the hidden/measured 
output of New Zealand or Canada, and then estimate a separate “cash-demand model” to 
obtain a benchmark for converting this index into percentage units. Unlike earlier empirical 
studies of the hidden economy, they paid proper attention to the non-stationary, and possible 
co-integration of time serious data in both models. Again this DYMIMIC model treats hidden 
output as a latent variable, and uses several (measurable) causal variables and indicator 
variables. The former include measures of the average and marginal tax rates, inflation, real 
income and the degree of regulation in the economy. The latter include changes in the (male) 
labor force participation rate and in the cash/money supply ratio. In their cash-demand 
equation they allow for different velocities of currency circulation in the hidden and recorded 
economies. Their cash-demand equation is not used as an input to determine the variation in 
the hidden economy over time – it is used only to obtain the long-run average value of 
hidden/measured output, so that the index for this ratio predicted by the DYMIMIC model 
can be used to calculate a level and the percentage units of the shadow economy. Giles latest 
                                                          
37) When applying this approach for European countries, Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) had the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable data for the cause series, besides the ones of direct and indirect tax burden. Hence, their study 
was criticized by Helberger and Knepel (1988), who argue that the results were unstable with respect to 
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combination of the currency demand and DYMIMIC approach clearly shows that some 
progress in the estimation technique of the shadow economy has been achieved and a number 
of critical points have been overcome. 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
There are many obstacles to be overcome to measure the size of the shadow economy (in 
value added and in the labor force) and to analyze its consequences on the official economy, 
although some progress has been made. In this paper has been shown that though it is difficult 
to estimate the size of the shadow economy (in value added and in the labor force), it is not 
impossible. I have demonstrated that with various methods, e.g. the currency demand, the 
physical input measure the discrepancy method and the model approach, some insights can be 
provided into the size and development of the shadow economy (labor force) of the 
developing, transition and the OECD countries. The general impression from the results of 
these methods is that for all countries investigated the shadow economy (labor force) has 
reached a remarkably large size. The results are shown in table 11. 
 
Table 11 
 
To summarize: As it has already been argued, there is no „best“ or commonly accepted 
method; each approach has its specific strengths and weaknesses as well as specific insights 
and results. Although the different methods provide a rather wide range of estimates, there is a 
common finding that the size of the shadow economies for most transition and all investigated 
OECD countries has been growing over the recent decade. A similar finding can be made for 
the „shadow labor market“ which is attracting a growing attention due to high unemployment 
in European OECD countries. Furthermore, the results of this study show that an increasing 
burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory 
activities, are the major driving forces for the size and growth of the shadow economy. 
Finally, to conclude: Shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, present to an important 
extent even in the industrialized and developed economies. People engage in shadow 
economic activity for a variety of reasons, among most important, of which we can count are 
government actions, most notable taxation and regulation. With these two insights, goes a 
third, no less important one: a government aiming to decrease shadow economic activity has 
to first and foremost analyze the complex and frequently contradictory relationships among 
consequences of its own policy decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
changing variables in the model and over the years. 
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Table 11: Average Size of the Shadow Economy for Developing, Transition and OECD-Countries in Terms of 
Value-Added and of the Labor Force over two periods (1999/2000) 
 
 
 
Average Size of the Shadow Economy – 
Value added in % of official GDP 
1999/2000 
Average Size of the Shadow Economy 
Labor Force in % of official Labor 
Force 1999/2000 
 
 
 
Countries Currency Demand and DYMIMIC method 
(Number of Countries) 
Survey and Discrepancy Methods 
(Number of Countries) 
Developing countries:   
 
Africa 
 
41 
(23) 
 
48.2 
(23) 
 
Central and South America 
 
41 
(18) 
 
45.1 
(18) 
 
Asia 1) 
 
29 
(26) 
 
33.4 
(26) 
Transition countries 35 
(23) 
- 
Western OECD Countries - Europe 18 
(16) 
16.4 
(7) 
North American and Pacific  OECD 
Countries 
13.5 
(4) 
- 
 
1) Here not all countries are developing countries like Japan, Singapore or Hongkong. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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